LINKING DEVELOPMENT WITH SECURITY IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH?
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR)

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INTRODUCTION

This paper is part of the presentation made in June 2012, in the city of Recife (Brasil), at the “Fifth South-South Summer Institute Rethinking Development: Global and Regional Alternatives for the Development in the Global South.” That wonderful academic event allowed more than thirty researchers and scholars from Latin America, Africa and South East Asia to gather, exchange ideas and perspectives about how to continue developing the Global South by the Global South. That presentation was also part of the author’s research about Human Security and SSR in the Global South at Osaka University, Japan. This paper introduces a policy approach that is being implemented in many countries in the Global South under the auspices of Northern Countries and International Organizations. It also intends to contribute to a better understanding of a global security issue. Personally, the author hopes to encourage more students and scholars to research about the links between

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Development and Security and the outcomes of SSR policies in the Global South.

SECURITY COOPERATION DURING THE COLD WAR

The Security Sector Reform arises from Civil-Military Relations and Development Studies. The latter started as a political science area of studies, especially, in the US after WW II and became a major theme as the military involvement in Latin American politics was increasing. The major powers during the Cold War (USSR and USA) were not interested in “using security and development assistance to promote democratic governance in the countries receiving aid” (BALL, 2010, p. 29). On the contrary, during the Cold War there were trends to support military regimes not only in Latin America but also in Africa and in some parts of Asia. In many aspects, that tendency was the result of the operations, planned by the US political system in a Cold War security scenario (CHUTTER, 2006, p. 3).

Apparently, governmental development donors did not have much to do with the Security Sector during the Cold War. In other words, SSR was not a necessity during those times while military governments were encouraged and tolerated as long as they pursued their anti-communist tasks. In fact, the situation was quite opposite. Instead to seeking to advice recipient countries about how to develop accountable and human respectful security forces, French Militaries were the ones providing the “expertise” acquired in Algeria’s repression and then it was the US who financed and supported Latin American’s military governments under the National Security Doctrine.
In reality, according to Bellamy (2003, p. 103), bilateral assistance in security areas is not a new concept and it was a common practice during the Cold War. In those days, both superpowers offered military aid for purposes of nation or state-building and political legitimization. Throughout Latin America in particular, the United States transferred large amounts of aid to reinforce armed forces capable of defeating communist insurgency. In this sense, the focus was primarily in helping to defend and then to create, non-communist states which they were also usually non-democratic and not human rights respectful.

On the contrary, at that time, International NGOs and also UN branches\(^1\) were not committed with security issues. Development agencies used to operate close to war zones providing humanitarian assistance or even trying to implement some development programs in countries under military regimes while disregarding political matters. The reasons were that International Organizations were ruled by the principles of restraint, consent, and neutrality. Emergency assistance for natural or human-caused disasters was provided separately from the long-term aid projects “diminishing the likelihood of agencies or militaries establishing the relationship between development and security” (BELAMY, 2003, p.103).

During the Cold War period, the security assistance can be characterized as bilateral. That means between two governments and not from international organizations to a particular nation. The security forces were entitled to work autonomously under the rule of force of authoritarian and military regimes. Civil society oversight and accountability under the rule of law was simply non-existent. The availability of resources for domestic development was reduced

\(^1\) Bellamy (2003: 103) refers to Save the Children, Oxfam, CARE, Medecins sans Frontieres, United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF)
in favor of inefficient security expenditure. The security was entitled to protect the ruling elite and to guarantee the stability of the regime and the state (BALL, 2010, p.30).

SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR POLITICS

In the 1980s and early 1990s, many military and authoritarian regimes in African, Latin American and Asian countries started to collapse. Moreover, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the political liberalization of Eastern Europe there was a change in the international political agenda and priorities. Gradually, development agencies began to highlight the fact that development depended on two factors which had been absent during the Cold War: democracy and security.

Even though democratization had not been an essential feature during the Cold War, once the ideological opponent to liberal capitalism was defeated Western powers started promoting democracy and to link it with economic development. By that time, it became necessary to renew the focus of their security apparatus in order to preserve the new regimes from authoritarian counter effects\(^2\). Violent conflict and illegitimate security actors were beginning to be seen as causing and perpetuating under-development and in this way development was starting to be linked with security (BELLAMY, 2003, p. 104).

In the 1990s, Donors increasingly focused their efforts in trying to reduce military expenditures for development purposes. In 1992, the Mali Government and the Tuareg rebels signed a peace

\(^2\) Although beyond the scope of this paper, it is interesting to think about to what extent was possible for transitional countries to fully re-gain control over their former repressive security sector and also able to deal with their legacy.
accord and two years after that, a UN mission proposed a security first approach. Under this scope development aid was bound to the demobilization of combatants and to the improvement of policing and border control. In that decade, the World Bank (WB), as well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) began addressing the security sector in their programs (as in Sierra Leone, in 1996, or in Zimbabwe and DRC in 1999) focusing on military budgets (COOPE; PUGH 2002, p. 6).

By the end of the 1990s, governance was a well-established part of the rhetoric among donors allowing discussions about the security sector and the security actors (Ball 2010: 32). At the same time and in the context of new defense diplomacy some multilateral organizations as NATO and OECD started to promote democratic civil-military relations in Central and Eastern European countries. Those countries were considered to be transitional. Later, when the European Union started taking part in these policies, non-military components, such as the police, the border guards and the judiciary were also targeted to be reformed.

Likewise, during the 1990s security studies became both deeper and broader. In this sense, it was Buzan (1991) who introduced and environmental. His analysis helped to deepen the understanding that “more people in the world are threatened by their own security forces than by other’s people’s, that military threats to security are only one of the causes of human insecurity” (BELLAMY, 2003, p. 105). Besides that, two factors helped to broaden security studies: one was theoretical and the other one practical.

The first and practical one was the trend to involve development programs with post-conflict and reconstructions missions. In these

3 Peacekeeping operations were launched in the 1990s in different parts of
cases, the security agenda was primarily associated with force reduction. Where reconstruction missions were taking place in after-war scenarios, security forces were seen as a threat. As we will see later in this paper, this insight also helped to change donor’s approach. In this sense, the innovation was that no matter how much international organizations might be working in an area, the delivery of assistance in insecure on unstable environments may not only be ineffective but could also potentially lengthen violent conflict and even reward warlords’ power. Furthermore, agencies that were already involved in peace-building actions realized that conflict prevention was less expensive than conflict recovery (BALL, 2010, p.32).

The second and theoretical element that influenced and broadened security studies was Human Security. As a title of the UN Development Program Report in 1994 this emerging paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities challenged the traditional notion of national security by arguing that the main referent for security should be the individual rather than the state. Human security highlights the fact that a people-centered view of security was necessary for national, regional, and global stability. Its argument distinguished “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear” as the best paths to tackle the problem of global insecurity and development. From this historical perspective it could be asserted that since the end of the Cold War, donors’ policies initiated a significant shift. There was a move from a narrow and bipolar Cold War conception to a broader security understanding. Within this political move but without definitive answers the SSR, as a policing approach, was going to be designed (COOPER; PUGH 2002, p.5). Before dealing

the world and post-conflict reconstruction took place in different places like in Cambodia, Kosovo, Aceh, Papua New Guinea, East Timor, the Solomon Islands, etc.
Mathias Valdez Duffau

with what is SSR, it is time to introduce the theoretical approach under which security and development appeared to be merged: the new aid paradigm.

THE NEW AID PARADIGM AND SECURING DEVELOPMENT

The World Bank (WB) explains the new aid paradigm by referring to the vicious circle. The WB assumes that poverty, fragility and conflict are intimately interrelated. It provides very clear statements to illustrate how, in its vision, this relation works in reality. For example, the WB understands that “poverty, fragility and conflict are, in many countries, elements of a vicious circle” and that “violence and fragility reinforce each other in several ways” (WORLD BANK, 2009, p. 3). The explanation appears to be simple. The cost of conflict is high and it not only undermines and slows down the pace of development but it deepens poverty and poses a threat to spill to neighbor countries across borders. Conflict creates IDPs, refugees, criminality, the spread of diseases, drugs abuses and extremist violence. Therefore, it is better for institutions to become engaged “to prevent fragility from degenerating into conflict in the first place” (WORLD BANK, 2009, p. 3).

Moreover, the WB states that violence undermines governance by limiting civic participation and if high levels of violence help to produce lawless areas, then state institutions are unable to deliver public service delegitimizing state’s authority. In the case of what the WB call extreme situations, fragile contexts may favor criminal networking to spread. If that occurred, there it would be a competition with the state itself, especially in the provision of security. “The close connection between violence and fragility shows
that by reducing violence the fragility might also be reduced. At least a minimum level of security must be established in order to allow citizens to rebuild the country” (WORLD BANK, 2009, p. 27).

In other words, because fragility, violence and development are said to be intertwined then security becomes a key aspect in the donors’ development agenda. World Bank President Robert B. Zoellick synthesizes the idea by affirming that:

This is not security as usual or development as usual. Nor is this about what we have come to think of as peace building of peace keeping. This is about Securing Development – bringing security and development together first to smooth the transition from conflict to peace and then to embed stability so that development can take hold over a decade and beyond. Only by securing development can we put down roots deep enough to break the cycle of fragility and violence (WORLD BANK, 2009, p. 4).

In a sense, the academic support for this new aid paradigm comes from Paul Collier, an English economist who connects underdevelopment and conflict under his ‘bottom billion’ countries explanation. Collier (2008) deals with the explanation of how certain groups of low-income countries with a combined population of around a billion people had missed out on global economic development and so had diverged from the rest of mankind. Under his vision less developed countries are locked in what he refers as conflict traps. Helping those countries to catch up the rest is a central issue of development. Basically, conflict traps can be caused by civil wars, coup d’états and by competing powers for controlling natural resources. According to Collier, governments of the bottom billion do not rely upon their own security forces because they can be a threat to development. In his words, “the situations where governments
face the greatest risks their own military establishments are not the solution but rather part of the problem” (COLLIER, 2008, p. 131).

Even though the provision of security seems to be a basic example of a public good sometimes it is not effectively provided by states of the ‘bottom billion’. Because those governments have small size economies they cannot afford to provide effective security to their populations like large scale and rich economies can. Bottom billion governments face the dilemma of whether or not to finance and equip a military because it would secure power against rebellions on one hand but, on the other, it also might increase the threat of a coup d’état to take place. On the contrary, the idea is that weak military are less capable of conducting successfully a coup but they cannot defeat strong insurgency of rebellions either (WORLD BANK, 2009, p. 11).

In other to contribute to solve this dilemma, Collier openly states that external military intervention has an important place in helping the societies of the bottom billion, and that these countries’ own military forces are more often part of the problem than a substitute for external forces (COLLIER, 2008).

In his opinion until 1990 international military intervention into failing states was just an extension of the Cold War. After that period he highlights that military interventions are still needed. From his point of view, there are “three important roles for external military interventions: restoration of order, maintaining post conflict peace, and preventing coups” (COLLIER, 2008, p. 124).

Following this logic, the cost-benefit analysis of development aid from the security perspective is presented as simple to understand in post-conflict scenarios. The main concern for development donors
in a post-conflict case is that the risk is high. In Collier terms (2008, p. 106) “around half of all civil wars are post-conflict situations gone wrong”. This seems to prove that the higher the risk is the deeper the country might be trapped in the conflict cycle, local governments are aware of it and if they can manage their economies well, they would increase the wealth and decrease the risk. In order to keep the risk down while developing the economy, Local Governments do need some military force to maintain peace during this initial post-conflict period. This is what in practice “securing development” is about and this also part of the basic argument of SSR.

However, Collier (2008, p. 133) points out that if the force is domestic, it might also exacerbate the problem. Therefore, in a post-conflict situation some extent of an external military force would be preferable to take action in order to provide security for development. In this context, peace-keeping becomes again an effective option to provide security and to decrease the risk level. In economic terms, peacekeeping is expensive but the cost of conflict is much higher (WORLD BANK, 2009, p. 12). Because of it, the security benefits alone appear to be more than enough in order to justify a large amount of development aid in post-conflict scenarios. The conflict trap theoretical framework provides extensive support to what the WB understands as ‘securing development’ which might also end up favoring donors’ interest in security matters.

In other sense, the World Bank (2009) also assumes that “securing development” depends on building an effective state. But, what does effective state mean? The OECD defines it in the following terms:
An effective state has both the capacity and willingness to mobilize resources, exercise political power, control its territory, manage the economy, implement policy, and promote human welfare in an inclusive manner, including delivery of vital services such as justice and security, health care, education, water and sanitation (WORLD BANK, 2009, p. 4).

Furthermore, the process of building effective states from donors’ perspective it is called state-building. Then, what is state-building about? It is “about creating institutions that are effective in the eyes of their beneficiaries, and which can be self-sustaining within a reasonable timeframe” (WORLD BANK, 2009). In this regard, the WB promotes itself as highly capable for helping countries to conduct state-building policies. In fact, the World Bank defines itself as an organization that “can assist countries by laying out solid technocratic advice on best practices in state-building” (WORLD BANK, 2009, p. 4).

In the case where a certain country has already been through the state-building process and the outcome was not satisfactory, then capacity building is required. What is it? Capacity Building “depends on a reform of public administration, at least in the departments responsible for core services; such reform must strengthen incentives, organization, staffing and accountability” (WORLD BANK, 2009, p. 5). In a few words, in order to make aid work effectively, an effective state is needed. To develop an effective state, state-building is the name of the required process. Once the state is built, if not effective, it is possible to be reformed by focusing on capacity building.

In the end, what is the connection between state-building and SSR? The answer is that effective states need to have effective security sectors to secure stability, development and to decrease the risk of conflict. Moreover, effective security actors are needed to
satisfy both the state and local populations security needs. This is why the development of SSR has been closely related with state-building endeavors in the post-Cold War era. Since the Security First initiative in Mail in 1992, from where the “new aid paradigm” was developed it has been assumed that self-sustaining security depends upon the “creation of a legitimate, democratically accountable and effective indigenous security sector” (BELLAMY, 2003, p. 101).

To summarize the core ideas, the new aid paradigm assumes that no peace is achievable without development, and no development is sustainable without security. That also means that no development is sustainable if there an ongoing conflict. Therefore, connecting development and security by implementing SSR (including DDR in post-conflict scenarios) appears to be the binding link of a virtuous circle. Furthermore, the process of creating a legitimate, democratically accountable and effective indigenous security sector as part of a state-building process was going to be labeled Security Sector Reform (SSR).

DOES THE “NEW AID PARADIGM MEAN SECURITIZING THE GLOBAL SOUTH?

Prof. Mark Duffield (2007) identifies this new aid paradigm as the result of the merger of two concepts: Security and Development. This is possible, according to the author, under the broad and common umbrella of Human Security (HS) which links sustainable development and international security and prioritizes the security of people over states. In this framework of analysis, International Security appears to be threatened, no longer by an external military hypothesis, but by underdevelopment. Under this logic, States are then distinguished between effective and ineffective, ‘weak’ or failed
ones. (DUFFIELD, 2007, p. 111). The State remains at the core of the development analysis but it is now entitled to secure humans from underdevelopment and becoming responsible to protect (R2P) individuals. In the pacification, post-intervention or contingent sovereignty era, that concept derives into the responsibility to reconstruct. In this sense, HS can be utilized as a policy approach concerning geopolitical interest of Northern countries. Terrorism and insurgency in the Southern populations moved from the homeland security policies to the International agenda while transnational networks and flows from failed countries are seen as a threat to the global order (DUFFIELD, 2007, p.113).

Moreover, according to Duffield (2007), the Human Security, although it is a rising concept promoted by a certain number of donor countries and institutions as the result of an increasing humanitarianism in international relations, it lacks a precise scope. In this sense, this author represents HS as the latest version of the interdependence between development and security. In fact, it enacts a multiple and complex capacity of different levels of global governance and international division of labor to work together across national borders. Human Security consolidates a liberal and individual-centered vision of the security problem where “human” corresponds to people’s capacity for self-management and self-reliance while “security focuses on the threats, risks and dangers deriving from underdevelopment. In his own words,

Human Security embraces a liberal people-centered problematic of security. It reflects the optimism of sustainable development with its promise of freedom and rights while also drawing attention to the ‘downside risks’” (DUFFIELD, 2007, p. 115).
From donors perspective, sustainable development finds its number one threat in internal conflict while sustainable development and internal conflict both focus on local communities (as beneficiaries in the former and as a victim in the latter). This understanding led to the assumption that security cannot be achieved without development and development is not possible without security. The post-Cold War increased in the number of wars taking place within states and not between them, was connected with an increase in religious and ethnic tensions. This situation also inflicted extensive suffering to civilian populations. In this way, internal conflicts fueled by religious and ethnic helped scholars to broaden the security scope. In addition to that, western moral values took internal conflicts into the international scene in the 1990s in order to justify a new type of post-Cold War interventionism: the humanitarian interventionism. Under the ‘new aid paradigm’ framework, Human Security can provide a theoretical justification to humanitarian interventions, Duffield (2007, p. 127) concludes.

If dealing with external interventions, Prof. Chandler (2008) reminds us that sovereignty in the field of international relations means both political and legal autonomy against any external interventions. By definition, states are equal and shall not be subordinated to each other and the concept is neither divisible nor limitable. During colonial times, the colonial power denied the right to self-determination to its colony or protectorate. But once independence was granted, they were said to be entitled with the indivisible and universal right to be sovereign. Particularly during the Cold War, the International Court of Justice defended the right of self-government and also the denial of any legitimate grounds for external intervention.
However after the Cold War, humanitarian interventions shifted that position into a broader pro-interventionist approach. The reason is that, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the focus was re-oriented towards the individual and his rights. Within this new scope states were not considered the core referent on security while state sovereignty was now no longer considered to be an absolute barrier to external intervention. Chandler (2008, p. 337) affirms that “much of the debate in the 1990s posed the human rights of individuals as counter to, and as undermining of, the rights of state sovereignty and as necessitating new rights of intervention for international institutions.”

Furthermore, during the 1990s, concepts like state and capacity building helped to shape a new change. As a consequence of this shift, international intervention serves as a way of “undermining non-Western state sovereignty” while the discourse is being constructed to portray international intervention as necessary in order to support and enhance the feeble sovereignty of the non-Western states (CHANDLER, 2008, p. 338). Intervention continues being international but not only military and it can be not only humanitarian but also institutionally oriented. Non-Western states appear to be seen as a threat or as a potential partner or ally who needs support and assistance. Their sovereignty is no longer defined as their capacity to exercise self-government. Sovereignty becomes then a principle due to suffer a transformation “through the liberal political economy of international intervention” (CHANDLER, 2008, p. 338).

In order to succeed in the transformation process, donors support and assistance are provided through the lenses of state and capacity building. What is then state building about? Chandler defines state-building in a particular perspective by stating that:
State building, the development of international regulatory mechanisms aimed at addressing cases of intra-state conflict and the state ‘collapse’, or at shoring up ‘failing states’, is commonly held to be the most pressing problem of global security, on ethical, humanitarian, and, in the wake of 9/11, realist security grounds (…) Since 1990s, the United States, the UK and other major Western governments have established new state building departments and policy units, while international institutions, from the UN down to more specialized international bodies engaged in economic development, democracy or human rights promotion (CHANDLER 2008, p.337).

The way these departments work is by linking the aid their governments or institutions provide with state-building and capacity-building programs. Consequently, the remaining question is whether international aid through state-building programs is an approach seeking to enhance effective, autonomous and sovereign states? If the answer is yes, then sovereignty might not be understood within the same scope as during the Cold War. In the end, Chandler (2008) explains that the redefinition of sovereignty is central for the state building approach which also helps to blur the borders from where international institutions succeed to intervene. This author concludes that the reason why international donors prefer to act “under the programs of liberal peace” is “to distance themselves from the consequences of the political and economic policies they promote” (CHANDLER, 2008, p. 339).

Following this logic, Human Security can be understood as a policy tool to promote liberal governance in the Global South. It requires the weak and failed distinction to assert its interventionism according to the R2P insecure populations. This classification of states is certainly unequal and does not include the insecure populations
living within rich and developed nations. In simple terms, “effective countries” find themselves capable of ensuring the well-being of populations living within ineffective territories or conflict areas (DUFFIELD, 2007, p. 122). Wherever the national-international boundaries become blurred, other public and private, international and regional institutions appear to be legitimized to operate at the community level of any weak or failed state. Duffield (2007, p. 130) reminds us that places like Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, East Timor or Iraq “relief and development assistance had been given the job of strengthening the legitimacy of weak and fragile states and remaking such countries into showcase examples of the benefits of Western involvement.”

The new aid paradigm appears to be a consequence of many historical and political events and also a particular insight from different approaches from a diversity of international actors to those events. Moreover, because donors found that dealing with long-term development projects in places with a lack of security was a barrier to their success, the engagement with the Security Sector also became crucial. Furthermore, hoping that armed forces could play a positive role in the development process, donors gradually began to be concerned about the unattended consequences that could emerge in cases where security cooperation was provided.

The Global War on Terror after the September 9 episode reinforced this concern and contributed to expand the global security side of the Human Security concept in a sense from which the times of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, concerning ineffective states, started to come to an end. This security-development nexus logic was also used to pave the road for a new and incipient interventionism in the name of war against terrorism. Following this perspective, a counter insurgency campaign on a global scale might be an implicit
major reason for aid agencies to engage in poverty reduction and democratic governance under the Human Security theoretical umbrella. If that would be the case, then it confirmed the hypothesis that the merge of Development and Security Assistance would be a strategic tool of what Duffield characterizes as the “unending war” (DUFFIELD, 2007, p. 126).

**LINKING DEVELOPMENT WITH SECURITY AND THE PROMOTION OF SSR**

Historically speaking, the SSR was initially introduced by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) by early 1999⁴. In a policy report on poverty and security sector the DFID (1997, p. 1) remarked that: “The link between security and development has been increasingly recognized in recent years, particularly since the end of the Cold War, and has been actively examined in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD.” By that time, the DAC was producing guidelines about conflict, peace and development cooperation. In this way development programs began to focus on addressing the root causes of conflict. Not only that but they also started to link its work with the promotion of good governance. This aspect was entitled to be achieved by strengthening the rule of law, improving policing and promoting accessible justice and personal security.

In practical terms during those days, SSR mostly focused on the defense sector, but after a few years, it was evident for the UK Government that SSR needed to have a broader scope that could include other areas. In this sense, by 2003, the security sector was being defined also taking into consideration other bodies that

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⁴ After the Labour Party, had won the elections in 1997.
legitimately deal with the use of force. This broad understanding now includes not only armed forces, police, and paramilitary units but also the judiciary, prisons, human rights commissions, defense and prosecutions services.

Being the creator it also was the main proponent of SSR. The UK strategically promoted SSR in the 1990s through the OECD DAC, and in the 2000s, within the UN system. Ball (2010, p. 34) affirms that “The UK frequently works through multilateral forums to promote its policy objective. DFID decided to promote its SSR agenda internationally by helping the DAC to develop donor thinking on SSR”. In this way, gradually SSR became part of donors’ agenda. Consequently, in 2004, the DAC members issued a policy brief called “Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice” in which SSR is explained as: “Security system reform (SSR) seeks to increase partner countries’ ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law.” It continues stating that: “SSR includes, but extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defense, intelligence and policing” (OECD, 2004, p.1).

Regarding SSR actors, OECD DAC (2004) states the following:

The security system includes the armed forces, the police and gendarmerie, intelligence services, and judicial and penal institutions. It also comprises the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight (e.g. parliament, the executive, and the defense ministry) (OECD DAC, 2004, p.1).

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DAC refers to SSR as Security System Reform and not Sector Reform.
In the same policy brief three main challenges “facing all states” are identified: i) developing a clear institutional framework for providing security that integrates security and development policy and includes all relevant actors and focuses on the vulnerable, such as women, children, and minority groups; ii) strengthening the governance and oversight of security institutions; and iii) building capable and professional security forces that are accountable to civil authorities and open to dialogue with civil society organizations (OECD, 2004, p. 2).

In 2007 the OECD issued the “OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR) – Supporting Security and Justice” in which a broader scope of the security-development nexus is explained in this way:

Security is fundamental to people’s livelihoods, to reducing poverty and to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. It relates to personal and state safety, access to social services and political processes. It is a core government responsibility, necessary for economic and social development and vital for the protection of human rights. Security matters to the poor and other vulnerable groups, especially women and children, because bad policing, weak justice and penal systems and corrupt militaries mean that they suffer disproportionately from crime, insecurity and fear. They are consequently less likely to be able to access government services, invest in improving their own futures and escape from poverty (OECD 2007: 13).

Think tanks have also contributed to the conceptual development of SSR. For example, The Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform – GFN SSR clarifies that “Whilst SSR is a relatively new term, it has been adopted by major international bodies and countries as a holistic concept that includes various disciplines
and covers many different sectors and in order to be successful; must be treated as such. However there is not yet one universally accepted definition” (GFN, 2007, p. 5). This organization published, in 2007, “A Beginner’s Guide to Security Sector Reform (SSR)” in which its own definition of SSR is states in these terms:

Security Sector Reform aims to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction, good governance and, in particular, the growth of democratic states and institutions based on the rule of law. This relies on the ability of the state to mitigate its people’s vulnerabilities through development, and to use a range of policy instruments to prevent or address security threats that affect society’s well-being. This includes establishing appropriate civilian oversight of security actors. Hence, a broader range of state institutions is now being considered in the provision of security, with the military seen as one instrument among many. The ‘security sector’ includes traditional security actors such as the armed forces and police; oversight bodies such as the executive and legislature; civil society organizations; justice and law enforcement institutions such as the judiciary and prisons; as well as non-state security providers” (GFN 2007, p. 4).

Partially critical of SSR, Chutter (2006) expresses interesting aspects concerning the lack of practitioners’ perspective in this matter. This author poses that the written material about SSR is normally composed by theoretical models drawn by political science scholars which are limited in the terms of understanding how the Security Sector actually works in practice and how it differs enormously from country to country. The reason of that is the lack of personal expertise of the authors. He concludes on the other hand, that the merge of the SSR with Development Policies has broadened the concept and created a certain degree of confusion about what SSR is really about.
Cooper and Pugh (2002, p. 1) propose a wider and more innovative understanding is need. They argue that a Security Sector Transformation should be addressed in order to delineate the “role that transformative strategies can play in preventing conflict and promoting post-conflict peace building.” They imply that donors must also reform their own security apparatus and recompose the ‘democratic deficit’ they have in the relationship with recipients particularly concerning donor’s security interests.

Bellamy (2003, p. 107) asserts that the: “Security sector reform therefore promises to assist the process of building democratic peace by fostering armed forces that reflect and promote liberal values.” How does it do it? According to the author “by enhancing human security, democratization, and broader development programs in places where there has either been ‘protracted social conflict’ as in East Timor or Cambodia or a track record of illegitimate and ineffective governance as in many other parts of the Southeast Asian region.”

As a practitioner working in SSR in Timor-Leste, McCullough (2007, p. 2)\(^6\) claims that SSR is a fairly simple concept. It is the “organizing policy and process for a set of activities through which the security system of a given country can evolve”. He emphasized that “it is an intrinsically political process creating winners and losers with all the associated fallout. In post-conflict countries, external actors have played a significant role in supporting, or even carrying out such activities, often as separate endeavors”. In his opinion “reform should be directed to ensure security institutions act in a people-centered manner.” He added that “further emphasis is thus placed on the principle that the actions of these security actors (as with all other actors) accord with principles of good governance,

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\(^6\) SSR expert in charge of the Security Sector Support Unit at the UNMIT
transparency and accountability”. In a few words⁷, he synthesized that SSR is a political, and not only technical, process. In his words, SSR is “dealing with the testicles of the state”, he summarized.

From a local adviser’s perspective, Simoes⁸ expressed that the UN and the UNDP have been promoting SSR in Timor-Leste, since 1999 until nowadays. In his own perspective, SSR means “no development without security.” In other words, it means that no country can develop with violence and instability. The link between security and development was re-affirmed after the 2006 crisis. Nowadays, Timorese government’s institutions are working on conflict prevention under the motto “Goodbye conflict, welcome development.” Nowadays, the Timorese society and leaders share a common perspective in order to avoid further foreign intervention by stating that “whatever happens we should not solve our problems through violence.” In this sense, SSR might be seen as a way to solve internal power disputes in a pacific manner in order to avoid further external interventions.

Technically speaking, it is easy to find nowadays SSR as something associated with academic programs and private consultancy companies dealing with a diverse spectrum that goes from disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, including child and female soldiers, combating small arms and light weapons (SALW) and demining, to transitional justice, strengthening human rights and the rule of law, fighting trafficking in human beings, weapons and drugs until good practices, civilian oversight and accountability for the security sector.

⁷ He was interviewed in his office at UNMIT on 1° April 2011
⁸ Security Advisor for the Secretary of Internal Security (Timor-Leste Government) who was interviewed in his office in Dili on 28 March 2011
THE UN ROLE ON SSR: Securing Peace and Development

In terms of the UN background, Ebo and Powell (2010, p. 45) affirm that “Security Sector Reform (SSR) is not a new activity for the UN” and, by 1989, the UN was already assisting the Government of Namibia in creating a new national army. Since then the UN has been involved in a variety of efforts concerning SSR in different regions of the world. This includes also the PKO in Angola, Mozambique and Rwanda in the 1990s where the UN was involved in DDR and armed forces training (UNSG, 2008, para 23).

It is only by October 2004 that the term “security sector reform” is explicitly mentioned by the Security Council9 “as an umbrella concept for defense and police reform as well as DDR” (HANGGI and SCHERRER, 2007, p. 6). It was not until very recently that the UN lacked a framework about this subject. In January 2008, the Secretary General addressed a report called “Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform” in which it is established that UN’s main task is “to support national actors in achieving their security, peace and development goals. To that end, the development of effective and accountable security institutions on the basis of non-discrimination, full respect for human rights and the rule of law is essential” (UNSG 2008, p. 1).

Ensuring international peace and security remains a UN’s main challenge and regardless its efforts during the last 60 years “conflict and violence continue to pose a threat to member states and peoples; freedom from fear and want remain elusive for many.” In this sense, “United Nations continues to search for effective

9 In Security Council Resolution 1565/2004 the term ‘Security Sector Reform’ is mentioned twice (p. 7 and 12)
responses to address insecurity based on its charter.” In this respect, two related central themes have emerged, the UN states. The first one “is that security, human rights and development are interdependent and mutually reinforcing conditions for sustainable peace”. The second one “is the recognition that these fundamental elements can be achieved only within a broad framework of the rule of law” (UNSG, 2008, para 1).

Under this understanding where development, human rights and security are intertwined within a rule of law framework the UN emphasized that “member States and their organizations remain central providers of security; this is their sovereign right and responsibility” (UNSG, 2008, para 2). In paragraph 11, the Secretary General warns that: “Security forces that are untrained, ill-equipped, mismanaged and irregularly paid are often part of the problem and perpetrate serious violations of human rights” and that “longer-term development demands a sufficient degree of security to facilitate poverty reduction and economic growth.” In the report, the Secretary-General defined the Security Sector by explaining that:

Security sector is a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country. It is generally accepted that the security sector includes defense, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included. Furthermore, the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Other non-State actors that could be considered part of the security
sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services (UNSG, 2008, para 14).

The UN recognized that each country defines security in accordance with its own “particular contexts, histories, cultures and needs. No single model of security sector exists. Effective and accountable security sectors, however, have a number of common features” (UNSG, 2008, p. 15). Among those common features it is pointed out the need for: a legal framework; an institutionalized system; the development of personnel’s capacities; transparent mechanism of interaction among security actors and the promotion of a culture of service.

Connected to the goal of effectiveness and accountability, the report highlighted the importance of the national commitment and ownership as key aspects for success by recognizing that SSR is a:

Highly political process that must be placed in its specific national and regional context. Effective support by outside actors also requires knowledge and sensitivity. Equally, successful reform of the security sector needs political commitment, basic consensus and coordination among national actors. Broad national consultation lies at the heart of national ownership. Ultimately, security sector reform can succeed only if it is a nationally led and inclusive process in which national and local authorities, parliaments and civil society, including traditional leaders, women’s groups and others are actively engaged (UNSG, 2008, para 36).

A set of ten basic principles are elucidated as guidelines or parameters for UN’s SSR initiatives. These include the following statements (UNSG, 2008: para 45):

1. The goal of the UN in SSR is to support states in
developing effective, inclusive and accountable security institutions;
2. SSR should be national decision based;
3. Success depends on national ownership and commitment;
4. UN’s approach must be “flexible and tailored to the country”;
5. The whole process must be gender sensitive;
6. An SSR framework is essential from the very early post-conflict recovery stages;
7. A defined strategy with priorities, partnerships and timelines is required;
8. International support’s effectiveness depends on the level of accountability and resources that are provided;
9. Coordination among national and international actors is vital;
10. Regular evaluation and monitoring is needed to assess SSR progress.

In the end, what is SSR for the UN? In the paragraph 17 SSR is explained in the following way:

Security sector reform describes a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law. As the Security Council noted, security sector reform “should be a nationally owned process that is rooted in the particular needs and conditions of the country in question” (UNSG, 2008: para 17). “Security Sector Reform underscores that effectiveness; accountability
and democratic governance are mutually reinforcing elements of security. Thus, security sector reform offers a framework to assist national actors, the United Nations and other international partners in implementing a shared vision of security (UNSG 2008: para 18).

Who has this shared vision of security according the UN Secretary General? First of all, a variety of UN agencies that have been involved in SSR such as: Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Peace building Support Office, UNDP, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), etc. Other national partners are included in the answer, for example, the UK with its involvement in post-conflict Sierra Leone; Angola, South Africa and other African nation’s efforts in DRC and Burundi; and Latin American states’ security cooperation in Haiti. Other examples of bilateral partners are the US in Liberia, France in Lebanon and Australia in the South Pacific region. The Report continues stressing that some Regional and multilateral organizations are also engaged in SSR. For example: The African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union, DAC OECD, the World Bank and NATO (UNSG, 2008, section IV).

The UN also reflected about its lessons learned from previous engagements with SSR by stressing that “the most fundamental lesson for the United Nations is that security is a precondition for sustainable peace, development and human rights” and that the success of a PKO after its withdrawal from a post-conflict scenario depends on the effectiveness of the local security sector to maintain the path of sustainable peace and development. Cases like Haiti, Liberia and
Timor-Leste demonstrated the UN’s failure on institutional capacity building. Therefore, UN PKO “have increasingly emphasized the need to establish effective and accountable security sectors” (UNSG, 2008, para 35).

**SSR AS A WORK IN PROGRESS?**

Even though SSR appears to be as a non-contested policy in mainstream academia and donors’ community it could be affirmed that the variety of definitions and understandings might show something else. It appears to be that mostly donors (and not states nor practitioners nor scholars) are the ones who define what the security sector is and what its needs are. At least they make clear that there is no agreement in terms of a common terminology or approach within donors’ community. The terms used to describe the intended subject refer to security sector reform or security system reform, security sector transformation or development and they express not only a different definition but a different perspective in itself. Is it that specific policy tools are linked with the promotion of SSR policies depending on each country’s needs and also on Donors’ interests?

Lacking a common approach, these days, not only the UK Government, the OECD and the UN are supporting SSR programs around the world but also many other countries have included SSR in their development agendas. This includes a variety of donor nations as: Canada, France, Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, and the United States, plus International or Regional Organizations as African Union, Council of Europe, ECOWAS, European Union, Nato, OECD, Organisation Intl Francophonie, OSCE, SADC, UN system agencies, and the World Bank. Furthermore, SSR is not only being implemented by national or international actors but
also outsourced to Private Military e Security Companies (PMSC). Pingeot characterizes this situation as a dangerous partnership in the case of the UN and the PMSC.

When thinking about where is SSR being implemented, is it easy to find spots all around the Global South. Not only in ongoing or post-conflict countries as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, and Timor-Leste in the case of Asia, and Angola, Burundi, DR Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan if talking about some examples from Africa or Haiti and Colombia in the Americas. But also in transitional (post-soviet) nations of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, such as: Bulgaria, Rumania, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Bosnia and Kosovo (WULF, 2004).

Ball (2010: 36) refers that among the present confusion there is a certain agreement about two problems: the ineffective provision of security (and justice) because providers can also be part of the problem and the lack of accountability and oversight over the security sector by the civil society. The author adds that “the objective is to promote the effective and efficient provision of security and justice to people and the communities and states in which they live within a framework of democratic governance, rule of law and respect for human rights.” According to the author the SSR should be taken with caution, “as a work in progress.”

**CONCLUSION**

This paper is part of an ongoing research. Because of that, it has no conclusions to offer. However, it is willing to contribute with research questions for readers and scholars. As it is clear from the above, there is no precise understanding about SSR, its process and outcomes. Within the present broad scope, it might be relevant
to research how, in reality, does SSR work in linking security and development? Also whether, in reality, SSR per se secure peace and development and how does it enforce human security (i.e. people’s security) and not only state’s security?

Under these circumstances, it is uncertain how liberal values and human rights are supposed to be fulfilled as a result of an exogenous process by simply applying foreign aid policies intending to reform fragile and post-conflict (in some cases former repressive) security institutions. Remains unknown how Human Security is willing to ensure not only economical but also people’s social and political rights and whether SSR is really a human rights-based approach or just a part of a securitized development plan. Moreover and in reality, SSR might not be fully capable of achieving stability for sustainable development in post-conflict scenarios but it could be an agent contributing to violence and to further instability in recipient countries.

Increasing donors’ interest in security plus conditionality terms for providing aid could be seen as an imposed agenda by Western and former colonial powers. If that would be the case, how much of a change is there between Cold War security cooperation and nowadays SSR? Another interesting aspect for further research is why regional and former colonial powers are so interested in getting involved in SSR both bilaterally or under the umbrella of an international organization.

To what extent is legitimate that ‘effective’ countries entitle themselves to the commitment of ensuring the well-being of people living within ineffective territories? They appear to entitle themselves to protect and secure native populations’ human rights by implementing their developed notion of what security means but without proving whether and how SSR practically benefits
local people. If that is the case, then it would be relevant to conduct extensive research whether by merging development and security policies, Northern developed nations camouflage the protection of their national interests in the name of the well-being of the people in the Global South.

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RESUMO

A Reforma do Setor da Segurança (RSS) surgiu como uma abordagem política na agenda de desenvolvimento, na década de 1990. Depois da Guerra Fria, os doadores internacionais e as organizações multilaterais envolvidos com questões de desenvolvimento começaram a vincular o desenvolvimento com a segurança como uma maneira de resolver a necessidade de uma compreensão alternativa de questões de segurança relacionadas à assistência internacional. Originalmente promovido pelo Governo do Reino Unido, por meio da primeira OCDE, e, posteriormente, na ONU, a RSS foi retratado como parte do “paradigma de novos auxílios”. Buscando reduzir o risco de conflito e melhorar a estabilidade, e a fim de obter o “desenvolvimento seguro”, seu objetivo teórico é aumentar a segurança das populações locais através da criação de eficazes e responsáveis agentes de segurança respeitosos nos países destinatários. No entanto, a SSR também pode ser vista como uma ferramenta para proteger os interesses dos doadores no chamado pós-conflito, que é fraco e falido nos estados do Sul Global. Este artigo apresenta de que modo a segurança e o desenvolvimento uniram-se e, depois de lidar com o âmbito teórico da RSS, as definições e objetivos que sugerem novas áreas de investigação sobre as políticas implementadas da RSS e os seus resultados.


ABSTRACT

The Security Sector Reform (SSR) emerged as a policy approach in the development agenda in the late 1990s. After the Cold-War, International Donors and Multilateral Organizations engaged with development issues began to link development with security as a way to solve the need for an alternative understanding of security matters regarding international assistance. Originally promoted by the UK Government through the OECD first, and in the UN later, SSR was portrayed as part of the “new aid paradigm”. Aiming to reduce the risk of conflict and to enhance stability in order to “secure development”, its theoretical objective is to enhance local populations’ security by creating effective, accountable and human rights respectful security actors in recipient countries. However, SSR can also be seen as a tool for securing donors’ interests in so-called post-conflict, weak
and failed states in the Global South. This paper introduces the reader to how security and development became linked and after dealing with SSR theoretical scope, definitions and objectives, it suggests areas for further research about SSR implemented policies and its outcome.